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Emergence accountPrevious studies with preschoolers have reported ‘‘East–West”
contrasts in children’s executive function (East > West) and theory
of mind (East < West). This cross-cultural study with two samples
of older children from the United Kingdom and Hong Kong aimed
to test competing accounts of these contrasts that focus on either
global effects of culture or more specific effects of pedagogical
experience. Both groups of children in Hong Kong outperformed
the British children on executive function tasks. That is, with
respect to executive function, general cultural influences appear
to be salient. In contrast, compared with their U.K. counterparts,
children attending local schools in Hong Kong (but not those
attending British-based international schools in Hong Kong) per-
formed poorly on age-appropriate tests of theory of mind. With
respect to theory of mind, therefore, pedagogical experiences
appear to be more salient than factors related to the broad contrast
between individualist and collectivist cultures. Our findings also
contribute to the debate surrounding the relationship between
theory of mind and executive function; although scores on these
two sets of tasks were robustly correlated within each country,
the double dissociation between delayed theory of mind but supe-
rior executive function for children in local schools in Hong Kong
compared with their U.K. peers suggests that variation in executive
function may be necessary but is not sufficient to explain variation
in theory of mind.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
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Theory of mind is a developmental achievement that emerges early in life and continues to develop
during adolescence and adulthood. Developments in cognitive domains such as language and execu-
tive function, as well as social factors such as cultural practice, family context, and interactional and
pedagogical experience, all support the process of gaining insight into people’s mental world (for a
comprehensive review, see Hughes & Devine, 2015). Research in this field has been largely restricted
to young children (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004), although recent years
have seen growing interest in infants’ mental state understanding (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;
Sodian, 2011). Moreover, several studies have reported striking individual differences in adults’ per-
spective taking (Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013; Ferguson & Austin, 2010; Keysar,
Lin, & Barr, 2003; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003).
What remains scarce, however, is research on theory of mind during middle childhood that bridges
the gap between these two fields. A few studies (e.g., Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011; Devine &
Hughes, 2013; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010) have shown age-related gains in theory of
mind across middle childhood, but individual differences in theory-of-mind development during this
period and their underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. To address this challenge, the
current study examined both internal and external factors that might contribute to individual differ-
ence in theory of mind beyond early childhood. With regard to internal factors, we focused on exec-
utive function, the higher level cognitive ability that underpins flexible, goal-directed activity using
working memory, attention shifting, and inhibitory control (Blair, Zelazo, & Greenberg, 2005;
Diamond, 2013). With regard to external factors, we focused on social and pedagogical experiences
at school, which increase in frequency and complexity across middle childhood (Eccles, 1999).Theory of mind across cultures
Although most theory-of-mind research has been conducted within Anglo-Saxon countries
(Hughes & Devine, 2015), the past decade has seen a marked increase in cross-cultural research
(e.g., Callaghan et al., 2005; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008), including several cross-cultural
comparisons (Ahn & Miller, 2012; Hughes et al., 2014; Lecce & Hughes, 2010; Lewis et al., 2009;
Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). This cross-cultural perspective is helpful in unraveling
the nature versus nurture riddle in theory-of-mind development: Is theory of mind an innate, cultur-
ally universal construct that is merely triggered by environmental factors, or is it cultivated in a con-
text of social interaction, displaying culturally specific developmental routes?
Existing findings are mixed. Some cross-cultural studies (e.g., Callaghan et al., 2005; Oberle, 2009)
have highlighted synchrony in the onset of false belief understanding, but others have reported dra-
matic contrasts. For example, Mayer and Träuble (2013) found that under the age of 8 years Samoan
children overwhelmingly failed false belief tasks, with one third of 10- to 13-year-old Samoan children
also failing. These results echo earlier reports of delays in non-Western children’s understanding of
false belief (e.g., Naito & Koyama, 2006; Vinden, 1996). Moreover, a meta-analysis of data from more
than 3000 children frommainland China and Hong Kong showed that althoughmainland Chinese chil-
dren were more or less in line with North American children in the onset of false belief understanding,
children in Hong Kong lagged behind by up to 2 years (Liu et al., 2008).
If preschoolers in Hong Kong lag behind their Western peers by up to 2 years in their false belief
understanding (Liu et al., 2008), do they catch up eventually? There is some evidence to suggest that
Chinese adults might in fact have better perspective taking than their Western counterparts. Wu and
Keysar (2007) found that bilingual Chinese American adults outperformed European Americans in
perspective taking. However, a later reanalysis of Wu and Keysar’s data using a more time-sensitive
approach found that the Chinese participants made the same egocentric mistakes initially in interfer-
ence as the European American participants but suppressed the interference earlier and more effec-
tively (Wu, Barr, Gann, & Keysar, 2013). That is, rather than having a more advanced perspective
taking ability, the bilingual Chinese participants appeared to capitalize on their relatively advanced
executive functions (Sabbagh et al., 2006). To date, no study has gone beyond the preschool years
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our study was to compare older children from the United Kingdom and Hong Kong on a battery of
age-appropriate theory-of-mind tests in order to assess whether children in Hong Kong ‘‘catch up”
in theory of mind during middle childhood.
Explaining cultural contrasts: The role of educational experiences
Howmight potential differences in theory-of-mind use between children from Hong Kong and chil-
dren from the United Kingdom be explained? According to one hypothesis, our cultural norms (collec-
tivist vs. individualist) about actions and cultural specific epistemologies shape our mental state
inferences (Ames et al., 2001). For example, the emphasis on obedience and behavioral inhibitory con-
trol in parenting practice within collectivist cultures might lead to reduced conversational exposure to
mental state terms (e.g., Mayer & Träuble, 2013). Related to this view, Lu, Su, and Wang (2008) found
that, in both a longitudinal study and a training study, Chinese preschoolers’ success on false belief
tasks was associated with increased conversational references to other people rather than to talks
about mental states in particular. In contrast, Chasiotis, Kiessling, Hofer, and Campos (2006) argued
that conflict inhibition, but not delay inhibition, is a culture-independent, universal developmental
prerequisite for the development of theory of mind.
As Hughes et al. (2014) have noted, attributing the cross-cultural difference in theory of mind to
individualist versus collectivist contrasts is an oversimplification. Moreover, this hypothesis fails to
account for the discrepancy between Hong Kong children and the mainland Chinese children found
by Liu et al. (2008). In similar collectivist cultures, Japanese children passed the false belief task at
around 6 to 8 years of age (Naito & Koyama, 2006), considerably later than the Western norm of
4 years (Wellman et al., 2001), whereas Korean children have been found to outperform their U.S.
and British counterparts on false belief tasks (Ahn & Miller, 2012).
Likewise, contrasts have been reported between children from different parts of Europe: the United
Kingdom and Italy (Lecce & Hughes, 2010). In the first cross-cultural study of theory of mind to estab-
lish measurement invariance (i.e., to ensure that group contrasts did not simply reflect spurious mea-
surement effects), Hughes et al. (2014) compared means on a latent theory-of-mind factor in school-
aged children from the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan matched on age, gender, and verbal ability.
Their findings replicated both the U.K.–Italy contrast (Lecce & Hughes, 2010) and previous reports of a
delay in Japanese children (Naito & Koyama, 2006). However, there was no clear difference between
Italian and Japanese children, challenging a simple individualist versus collectivist contrast. Instead,
Hughes et al. (2014) proposed that the differences reflected contrasts in pedagogical experience
because children in the United Kingdom start formal schooling at age 4 or 5 years, at least a year ear-
lier than Italian and Japanese children.
The ‘‘pedagogical experience” hypothesis rectifies the oversimplification of individualist versus col-
lectivist contrast by shifting the focus from a broad cultural construct to a more practical, socially
organized activity (Ratner, 1999), in this case, schooling, as the primary cultural influence on psychol-
ogy. This pedagogical experience hypothesis is in line with an environmental account that emphasizes
the social origins of individual differences in understanding of mind. Evidence for this view comes
from several distinctive lines of research, including studies of twins and deaf children born to hearing
versus deaf parents, training studies, and longitudinal studies of relations between family discourse
and theory of mind (for a comprehensive review, see Hughes & Devine, 2015). Formal schooling
immerses children in learning activities that involve interpreting both epistemic mental states (e.g.,
knowledge, memories, ignorance, false belief) and motivational mental states (e.g., attention, inten-
tion). These experiences are likely to benefit children’s theory-of-mind development (Frye & Wang,
2008; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Consistent with this view, theory of mind has been related
to children’s understanding of the concept of teaching and learning (Frye & Ziv, 2005; Wang, 2010; Ziv
& Frye, 2004; Ziv, Solomon, & Frye, 2008) as well as children’s own teaching activity (Davis-Unger &
Carlson, 2008a, 2008b).
Our study provided a unique opportunity to test the pedagogical hypothesis. As a former
British colony in the Far East that is now ‘‘Asia’s World City,” Hong Kong includes both international
schools, most of which adopt inquiry-based curricula and use English as a mode of instruction, and
Z. Wang et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 149 (2016) 6–22 9Chinese-style local schools, which focus heavily on academic learning (Watkins & Biggs, 2001), even in
early childhood classrooms. Teachers in Hong Kong local schools emphasize behavioral control and
the need to follow instructions instead of inquiry (Cheng, Benson, Lau, & Fung, 2009). Children’s early
pedagogical experience is mainly directed to the mastery of language and literacy, which is predom-
inantly taught in local Hong Kong schools via a drill-and-practice approach (Li & Rao, 2005) due to the
fact that children live in a trilingual (Cantonese, Mandarin, and English) biliterate (Chinese and Eng-
lish) society. According to the pedagogical hypothesis, children attending international schools in
Hong Kong should perform just as well on theory-of-mind tasks as their British counterparts because
they share a similar schooling experience. In contrast, children attending local schools in Hong Kong
have quite distinct school experiences that are less rich in opportunities for discussing different points
of view and so might be expected to lag behind their British counterparts in their theory-of-mind
performance.
The second goal of the current study was to test this pedagogical hypothesis. By pairing up U.K.
pupils and Hong Kong international school pupils, as well as U.K. pupils and Hong Kong local school
pupils, we singled out the effect of pedagogical experience that is usually embedded in a broader cul-
tural context. According to the collectivist versus individualist culture divide hypothesis, both groups
of children in Hong Kong should differ from children in the United Kingdom in their theory-of-mind
performance. According to the pedagogical hypothesis, however, children in the United Kingdom are
expected to show better theory of mind than children in Hong Kong attending local schools but not
those attending international schools.
Executive function in theory of mind during middle childhood
Executive function is closely associated with the acquisition of false belief during early childhood.
The relation between theory of mind and executive function can be summarized by either the ‘‘expres-
sion” account or the ‘‘emergence” account (Moses, 2001). According to the expression account, the
executive demands of theory-of-mind tasks (in particular false belief tasks) mask children’s under-
standing of mind. Specifically, children’s failure on theory-of-mind tasks reflects the executive
demands in those tasks rather than a lack of theory of mind. According to the emergence account,
however, executive function is a necessary condition for the acquisition of theory-of-mind under-
standing. Children need to acknowledge different points of view and be able to hold back their own
perspective in order to appreciate other perspectives. In a recent meta-analysis based on 102 studies
representing close to 10,000 3- to 6-year-old children from 15 countries, Devine and Hughes (2014)
reported a consistent and moderate correlation (r = .38) between false belief understanding and exec-
utive function that remained significant when effects of age and verbal ability were controlled. Further
analysis of 10 longitudinal studies indicated that early individual differences in executive function
modestly predicted later theory of mind, even when controlling for previous theory-of-mind scores
and verbal ability, but not vice versa. Interestingly, the correlation between executive function and
theory of mind appeared to be consistent across different cultures. The findings support an emergence
account of the relation between theory of mind and executive function.
The expression account posits that children with the greatest levels of executive function perfor-
mance should outperform their peers on measures of theory of mind, whereas the emergence account
is more tolerant to a disassociation between theory-of-mind performance and executive function per-
formance. Sabbagh et al. (2006) compared American and Chinese preschool children on measures of
theory of mind and executive function. Despite a marked advantage in executive function relative
to their American peers, Chinese children did not outperform their American counterparts on mea-
sures of theory of mind. The results seem to support the emergence account. The expression account
also predicts that only the theory-of-mind tasks with high executive demands, but not those with low
executive demands, would correlate with executive function; on the contrary, the emergence account
predicts that executive function should correlate with theory-of-mind tasks with either high executive
demands or low executive demands. Testing this possibility, Carlson, Claxton, and Moses (2015) mea-
sured preschool children with executive function tasks, theory-of-mind tasks with high executive
demands, and theory-of-mind tasks with low executive demands. They found that executive function
tasks, specifically conflict executive function tasks, correlated uniformly with theory-of-mind
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again supporting an emergence account.
During middle childhood and adolescence, children continue to develop both executive function
(e.g., Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006) and the-
ory of mind (e.g., Devine & Hughes, 2013; Dumontheil et al., 2010). Moreover, individual differences in
theory of mind remain correlated with executive function during middle childhood (e.g., Bock,
Gallaway, & Hund, 2014; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014).
To date, however, the links between theory of mind and executive function during middle childhood
have not been studied in a cross-cultural context. Examining the relations between theory of mind and
executive function in different cultures provides an opportunity to understand the nature of these
links. Our third goal, therefore, was to compare executive function and theory-of-mind performance
in school-aged children from the United Kingdom and Hong Kong using online theory-of-mind mea-
sures and examine the association between individual differences in these two domains in each sam-
ple. In doing so, we sought to examine the universality of the relation between theory of mind and
executive function during middle childhood.
Moreover, our study gave us an opportunity to test the expression account versus emergence
account of the executive function and theory-of-mind relation. According to the expression account,
if children in Hong Kong outperformed the British children on executive function measures, they
should also do better in theory-of-mind measures. According to the emergence account, children in
Hong Kong would not necessarily outperform their British counterparts in theory-of-mind measures
even if they did so in executive function measures. In contrast to false belief tasks, in which children
need to inhibit their own more salient knowledge about a situation in order to infer a protagonist’s
false belief, the online measures of theory of mind simply require children to explain the protagonist’s
behaviors and so impose a lower executive demand. According to the expression account, these mea-
sures would not correlate well with executive function measures. The emergence account predicts
that executive function measures should correlate with theory-of-mind measures with either high
executive demands or low executive demands (Moses, 2001).
In summary, our study had three key aims: (a) to investigate similarities and differences in theory
of mind in children from the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, (b) to assess the role of pedagogical
experiences in shaping individual differences in theory of mind, and (c) to examine the universality
of the relations between theory of mind and executive function during middle childhood. To address
these three aims, we drew on two data sets that included aggregate measures of theory of mind during
middle childhood that were administered to samples of children in Hong Kong and the United
Kingdom.Method
Participants
Sample 1 consisted of 118 children (48% male) recruited from seven English-speaking international
schools in Hong Kong and six state primary and secondary schools in the United Kingdom as part of a
follow-up study of children’s social development in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong led by the
third author (Wong, Freeman, & Hughes, 2014). Follow-up children were matched in age, t(118)
= 0.57, p = .57, and self-reported family affluence, t(117) = 0.49, p = .63. Inclusion criteria for both sites
were (a) no known developmental delays or disabilities and (b) native speaker of English or spoke Eng-
lish as a second language. The U.K. sample was predominantly White British (77.5%, n = 39; 53% male)
with a mean age of 12.42 years (SD = 1.89, range = 9.00–16.07). The Hong Kong sample was more eth-
nically diverse (n = 78; 45% male) than the U.K. sample (77.5% White British) in that children reported
being Chinese (43.6%), White British (17.9%), and mixed race (17.9%) with a mean age of 12.38 years
(SD = 2.00, range = 9.10–15.62). However, a t-test confirmed that the two samples did not differ in age,
t(116) = 0.10, p = .92. In both samples, English was the primary language spoken at home (United
Kingdom = 97.5%; Hong Kong = 61.5%), with Cantonese (16.7%) and Mandarin (9%) being the two other
most spoken languages at home. In terms of family background, the children from the United Kingdom
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from Hong Kong (M = 1.01, SD = 0.72). Parental education levels were higher in the Hong Kong sample
than in the U.K. sample, v2(1) = 9.89, p < .01, / = .31. Specifically, 68 of 78 mothers in the Hong Kong
sample had a university degree or higher, whereas 33 of 39 mothers in the U.K. sample had upper sec-
ondary school education or a university degree. In terms of socioeconomic status, 80.3% to 85.4% of U.
K. and Hong Kong participants fell in the ‘‘affluent” band, respectively, as measured by the Family
Affluence Scale (Boyce, Torsheim, Currie, & Zambon, 2006).
Sample 2 consisted of 137 children taking part in the fifth wave of an ongoing longitudinal study of
social and cognitive development in the United Kingdom (Hughes, 2011). We recruited a comparable
sample of 125 children recruited from state primary schools in Hong Kong. Inclusion criteria for both
sites were (a) no known developmental delays or disabilities and (b) native speaker of English/Can-
tonese (as appropriate). From this sample of 262 children, we created two groups of children individ-
ually matched on age (in months) and gender from the Hong Kong sample to children in the U.K.
sample. In each site, there were 108 children (57% male). The U.K. sample was predominantly White
British with a mean age of 10.81 years (SD = 0.39, range = 10.05–11.55). The Hong Kong sample was
predominantly ethnic Chinese with a mean age of 10.81 years (SD = 0.35, range = 10.05–11.54); a t-
test confirmed that the two samples did not differ in age, t(214) = 0.05, p = .96. In terms of family
background and socioeconomic status, the children from the United Kingdom had significantly more
siblings (M = 2.02, SD = 1.45), t(214) = 6.34, p < .001, d = 0.87, than the children from Hong Kong
(M = 1.01, SD = 0.80). Parental education levels were also higher in the U.K. sample than in the Hong
Kong sample, v2(1) = 16.75, p < .001, / = .28. Specifically, whereas 64 mothers in the U.K. sample had
upper secondary school education (e.g., A levels) or a university degree, only 33 of the mothers in the
Hong Kong sample had upper secondary school education or a university degree. In terms of self-rated
affluence, children in the United Kingdom (M = 6.09, SD = 1.80) gave themselves higher ratings on the
Family Affluence Scale than children in Hong Kong (M = 4.46, SD = 1.86), t(212) = 6.53, p < .001,
d = 0.90. These between-sample differences in family background and socioeconomic status were con-
trolled statistically in each of our models.
Measures
Table 1 summarizes the measures administered to Samples 1 and 2.
Theory of mind
Each theory-of-mind task involved watching a short film clip or listening to a short audio file (30 s
in length) and then either explaining a character’s behavior or answering short questions about a char-
acter’s thoughts and feelings. The children from both samples completed the Triangles Task (Castelli,
Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000). In this task, the children watched three short silent cartoons depicting two
triangles moving about against a white background. Designed to elicit mental state attributions, these
cartoons featured instances of coaxing, teasing, and surprising. Using the coding scheme developed byTable 1
Measures administered to Samples 1 and 2.
Domain Measure Sample 1 Sample 2
Theory of mind Triangles Task U U
Silent Film Task U U
Strange Stories ✗ U
Executive function Bead Memory U U
Digit Span Backward U ✗
Trail Making U ✗
Arrows Task ✗ U
Smiling Faces ✗ U
Verbal ability Word Reasoning (WISC-IV) U ✗
BPVS ✗ U
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clivity to ascribe mental states when explaining the actions of the triangles) and accuracy (i.e., how
closely descriptions matched the intended story). Intentionality scores ranged from 0 (non-
deliberate action) to 5 (deliberate actions with the goal of affecting others’ mental states). Accuracy
was scored as 0 (incorrect descriptions), 1 (imprecise descriptions), or 2 (correct descriptions of the
story presented in the clip). We created total scores by summing together intentionality and accuracy
scores for each item (possible range = 0–21).
The children in both samples also completed the Silent Film Task (Devine & Hughes, 2013). In this
task, the children were required to explain the behavior of characters in five clips (30 s in length)
from a classic silent comedy played once in a fixed order. The first clip was accompanied by two ques-
tions, and the remaining four clips were followed by one question. Following the coding scheme devel-
oped by Devine and Hughes (2013), participants received 2 points for responses that correctly
described the events shown in the clip with reference to characters’ mental states, 1 point for answers
that correctly described the events but did not use mental explanations, and 0 points for irrelevant or
factually incorrect responses. Scores for individual items were summed together to create a total score
(possible range = 0–12).
In addition, the children in Sample 2 completed the Strange Stories Task. For this task, we used five
vignettes (taken from Happé, 1994) that depicted social situations involving double bluffs, deception,
and misunderstanding. After each vignette, the children were asked to explain a character’s behavior.
The vignettes were translated into Cantonese by a panel of three English/Cantonese bilingual develop-
mental psychologists that included the lead author, adopting a collaborative and iterative translation
approach to ensure conceptual equivalence (Douglas & Craig, 2007). In each site, children listened to
recordings (30 s in length) of an adult reading each of the stories. The text of each story remained on-
screen after the audio recording stopped. Following the coding scheme developed by White, Hill,
Happé, and Frith (2009), fully correct responses received 2 points, partially correct responses received
1 point, and incorrect responses received 0 points; across the five vignettes, therefore, children could
score between 0 and 10 points.
The validity of these tasks as measures of theory of mind is supported by three sources of evidence.
First, these tasks have shown concurrent associations in a large sample of children ages 7 to 13 years
even when individual differences in verbal ability and narrative comprehension were taken into
account (Devine & Hughes, 2016). Second, performance on these tasks at age 10 years has also been
shown to be linked to earlier performance on a battery of false belief understanding tasks at age
6 years (Devine, White, Ensor, & Hughes, submitted for publication). Third, performance on these tasks
has been shown to be related to individual differences in children’s self-reported social competence
(Devine & Hughes, 2013).
For each task, the children’s responses were digitally recorded and later transcribed verbatim
for coding. To ensure comparability of ratings, 25% of the transcripts in each site in both studies
were double-coded. Individual items exhibited moderate to strong levels of reliability. In Sample
1, the two-way mixed single measure model type with absolute accuracy showed excellent
average measure reliability for the Silent Film Task total score (intraclass correlation (ICC)
[3, 1] = .96, 95% confidence interval (CI) [.89, .98], p < .001). The kappa values for all items were
within acceptable ranges (j = .73–1.00, SE = .00–.12). Similarly, the total intentionality (TTI) and
appropriateness (TTA) ratings on the Triangles Task showed excellent average measures reliabil-
ity (TTI: ICC[3, 1] = .96, 95% CI [.91, .98]; TTA: ICC[3, 1] = .90, 95% CI [.78, .96]; ps < .001), with
item-level ICCs ranging from .76 to .92. In Sample 2, the second author trained the Hong Kong
team in the rating procedures using transcripts from the U.K. sample as well as translated tran-
scripts from the Hong Kong sample. For the Strange Stories Task, the mean j was .92 and total
summed scores showed excellent levels of interrater reliability (ICC = .97, 95% CI [.94, .99],
p < .001). For the Triangles Task, the mean j was .77 and the total summed scores showed
excellent levels of interrater reliability (ICC = .97, 95% CI [.94, .99], p < .001). Finally, the individ-
ual items of the Silent Film Task showed acceptable levels of interrater reliability, the mean j
was .82, and summed total scores showed excellent interrater agreement (ICC = .94, 95% CI
[.87, .97], p < .001).
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The children in both samples completed the Bead Memory Task from the Stanford–Binet Intelli-
gence Scale (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986). On each trial, the participants were shown (for 5 s)
a picture of an arrangement of beads on a stick (across trials, the beads varied in number, shape, color,
and position). The participants were then given a box of beads and were asked to reproduce each bead
arrangement exactly. The task was discontinued after three failures across four trials. Raw scores were
calculated by subtracting the number of failed trials from the highest item attempted. Although ini-
tially designed to measure short-term visual memory, the Bead Memory Task also measures multiple
executive functions. Specifically, participants must (a) refrain from touching the beads while the
image is displayed, (b) hold the image in mind while they select the beads, and (c) plan ahead in order
to place the beads on the stick in the correct sequence. Performance on this task is correlated with per-
formance on measures of inhibitory control and set shifting during childhood (e.g., Hongwanishkul,
Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005; Hughes & Ensor, 2011).
The children in Sample 1 also completed the Digit Span Backward Test and the Trail Making Test.
The Digit Span Backward Test (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Fourth Edition [WISC-IV];
Wechsler et al., 2004) is a widely used assessment of working memory. The examiner read out a list
of numbers at approximately one digit per second, and the participants were asked to repeat this list
of digits in reverse order. Each list was read out once and increased by one digit until the participants
failed two consecutive lists of the same digit span. The correct responses were summed to create a
total score (ranging from 0 to 16) and standardized scores. Scores for the current study ranged from
4 to 16. The Trail Making Test A and B (Corrigan & Hinkeldey, 1987) is a two-part test measuring
switching and visual attention. The participants were timed on how quickly they could connect circles
without lifting their pen off the page. This was first done sequentially on a page of 25 randomly scat-
tered ‘‘numbered” circles on Form A (1-2- . . . 25) and then using an alternating order of ‘‘numbered–
lettered” circles on Form B (1-A-2-B, etc.). Each form started with practice items, and mistakes were
corrected and factored into total task completion time. The time difference between Form B and Form
A provided an index of executive function, where a longer time (in seconds) reflected poorer perfor-
mance. In this study, the time difference between forms ranged from 0 to 180 s. This was standardized,
and a higher value reflected poorer performance.
The children in Sample 2 completed the Arrows Task (Davidson et al., 2006), a measure of inhibi-
tory control. In this task, participants viewed one of four images of a purple arrow on a white screen
and needed to respond by hitting a key on the left (1) or right (0). The arrow pointed either directly
downward or diagonally on either the left- or right-hand side of the screen. During control trials,
the arrow appeared on either the left or right and pointed directly downward, and participants needed
to press the button on the same side as where the arrow appeared. During test trials, the arrow
appeared on either the left or right but pointed diagonally. On these trials, participants needed to press
the button on the opposite side of where the arrow appeared. The participants received detailed
instructions and practice items prior to completing the task. The arrows were displayed for up to
750 ms and were preceded by a 500-ms interval in which a crosshair was displayed against a white
background. The children completed 12 control trials and 12 test trials in a random order. To measure
inhibitory control, we calculated efficiency scores based on the total number of correct test trials
divided by the total time taken on test trials.
The children in Sample 2 also completed the Smiling Faces Task (Huizinga et al., 2006), a measure
of cognitive flexibility. During this task, the children needed to respond with a button press to one of
four cartoon faces (i.e., a happy boy, a happy girl, a sad boy, and a sad girl) displayed in one of four
quadrants on a white screen. In single task trials, the children needed to identify whether the face
was a boy or a girl if it appeared in the top two quadrants (by pressing 1 or 2) or to identify whether
the face was happy or sad if it appeared in the bottom two quadrants (by pressing 3 or 4). During alter-
nating trials, the children needed to integrate both rules. The trials were administered in four blocks in
a fixed order: one set of 16 single task trials (boy or girl), another set of 16 single task trials (happy or
sad), and two sets of 16 alternating trials. The trials within each block were presented in a random
order. The participants were provided with detailed instructions and were asked to repeat back the
rules of the task before each block. Each trial lasted up to 3500 ms, during which time the participants
needed to respond with a button press. The trials were preceded by a 500-ms interval in which a black
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total number of correct alternating trials divided by the total time taken to complete the alternating
trials.
Verbal ability
Unfortunately, there was no measure of verbal ability that had been standardized for use in both
Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. The children in Sample 1 completed the Word Reasoning Test
from the WISC-IV (Wechsler et al., 2004). In this task, the participants needed to identify the concept
being described in a series of 24 clues of increasing difficulty. Each item was scored as either correct
(1) or incorrect (0) before five consecutive ‘‘blanks” produced a total verbal ability score out of 24. We
standardized raw summed scores (with a possible range of 0–24) within each country using T-scores
so that each child’s verbal ability was measured against peers in his or her own country.
For the children in Sample 2, we adopted the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn & Dunn,
2007) because this is a widely used task that has very simple instructions. On each trial, the examiner
read aloud a word and the children needed to point to one of four pictures that provided the best
match for that word. We used the stimulus booklets and vocabulary lists from the U.K. version of this
task. Adopting a back-translation approach (Brislin, 1970), each word was translated into Cantonese
and then back-translated into English by a panel of three English/Cantonese bilingual developmental
psychologists that included the lead author. The panel discussed and modified the Cantonese version
to ensure that the two versions were equivalent in meaning. The Cantonese version was checked
against ‘‘Lexical items with English explanations for fundamental Chinese learning in Hong Kong
schools” provided by the Hong Kong Education Bureau (2009) to ensure progressive difficulty of the
vocabulary. We calculated raw scores by subtracting the number of errors made by each participant
from the item number corresponding to the last number in the participant’s ceiling set (i.e., the set
containing eight or more errors). We then standardized scores within each country using T-scores
so that each child’s verbal ability was measured against peers in his or her own country.
Procedures
The children in Sample 1 completed a 60-min individual testing session at school with the third
author on two theory-of-mind tasks (Silent Film and Triangles), three executive function tasks (Beads,
Digit Span Backward, and Trail Making), and a language test, among other tasks. All tasks were admin-
istered in English in both the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. At each site, the children in Sample 2
completed individual test sessions in a quiet environment at school. During these sessions (which
lasted 90 min, including breaks), an experienced graduate researcher administered a battery of tasks
presented in a counterbalanced order in either English (in the United Kingdom) or Cantonese (in Hong
Kong). The U.K. team provided the Hong Kong team with detailed training and observed pilot sessions
in Hong Kong to ensure that the data collection procedures were identical.Results
Analytic approach
In analyzing the data from both samples, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test mea-
surement models designed to reduce the number of variables in our data and provide error-free
parameter estimates. Next, we used multiple indicators, multiple causes (MIMIC) models (Brown,
2006) to examine cross-cultural differences in both the theory-of-mind and executive function latent
factors. Given the presence of non-normally distributed variables in each data set, we estimated each
model using robust maximum likelihood estimation (as opposed to maximum likelihood estimation)
in Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). The robust maximum likelihood estimator provides more accu-
rate parameter estimates than standard maximum likelihood estimation (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2011).
For each model, we evaluated fit using Brown’s (2006) four recommended criteria: a nonsignificant
chi-square (v2) test, comparative fit index (CFI)P .90, Tucker–Lewis index (TLI)P .90, and root mean
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interpreted in accordance with recommendations from Kline (2011); small standardized effect sizes
ranged from .10 to .30, moderate effect sizes ranged from .30 to .50, and large effect sizes were greater
than .50.
Descriptive statistics and data reduction
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics (and intercorrelations) for each of the key variables for Sample
1. There was no evidence of ceiling or floor effects on either the Triangles Task or Silent Film Task.
There were no differences between boys and girls in age, self-reported family affluence, or perfor-
mance on any measures of verbal ability, theory of mind, or executive function (1.36 6 tP 1.33,
all ps > .10). There were modest correlations between the two measures of theory of mind. The three
measures of executive function were moderately intercorrelated. With the exception of the Trail Mak-
ing Task and the Digit Span Backward Task, each of the variables conformed to normality (i.e.,
Zskew < ±3.29). Table 3 shows descriptive statistics (and intercorrelations) for each of the key variables
for Sample 2. Each of the three measures of theory of mind captured a wide range of individual differ-
ences, as evidenced by the symmetrical distribution of scores on each task. There was no evidence of
ceiling or floor effects on either the Triangles Task or Silent Film Task; no participants scored 0, and
only 1% of the participants obtained the maximum score on either task. The Strange Stories Task
showed some evidence of negative skew, with 12.5% of the participants achieving the maximum score.
With the exception of the Arrows Task efficiency score, Strange Stories Task total score, and BPVS
score, all of the key variables conformed to normality (i.e., Zskew < ±3.29).
Data reduction
In Sample 1, we tested a two latent factor model using CFA. First, we loaded both theory-of-mind
indicators onto a single theory-of-mind latent factor. Next, we loaded each of the three executive func-
tion indicators onto a separate (but correlated) executive function latent factor. This measurement
model provided a good fit to the data, v2(4) = 1.60, p = .81, RMSEA = .00, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, AkaikeTable 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations for key variables in Sample 1.
Age Verbal Triangles
Task
Silent Film
Task
Bead
Memory
Digit Span
Backward
Trail Making
(B–A)
Age (years) – .28* .41** .06 .47** .38** .42**
WISC-IV verbal (raw
score)
.32* – .08 .07 .29* .29** .35**
Triangles Task –.01 .29 – .39** .21 .12 .17
Silent Film Task .32* .19 .13 – .07 –.02 .12
Bead Memory .28 .35* .38* .26 – .45** .33**
Digit Span Backward –.13 .13 .44** .23 .39* – .47**
Trail Making
(reversed)
.50** .06 .11 .28 .44** .12 –
Mean U.K. 12.42 13.01 12.79 8.10 27.58 7.83 43.74
H.K. 12.39 13.37 12.90 7.91 28.54 8.58 38.19
SD U.K. 1.89 3.97 4.23 2.53 3.88 2.06 28.27
H.K. 2.00 3.46 5.00 2.17 3.84 2.34 27.66
Range U.K. 9.00–
16.07
4–20 1–20 0–12 21–36 5–14 122.8 to
32.26
H.K. 9.10–
15.62
5–20 0–21 0–12 21–37 4–16 148.10 to
3.29
Note. U.K., United Kingdom; H.K., Hong Kong; SD, standard deviation.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlations for key variables in Sample 2.
Age BPVS Strange
Stories
Triangles
Task
Silent Film
Task
Bead
Memory
Arrows Smiling
Faces
Age (years) – .22* .15 .20* –.05 .18 .15 .19*
BPVS (raw score) .17 – .58** .29** .38** .52** .32** .35**
Strange Stories .06 .23* – .35** .34** .43** .28** .31**
Triangles Task .18 .29** .30** – .22* .18 .17 .11
Silent Film Task .07 .13 .22* .42** – .21** .10 .09
Bead Memory .24* .36** .32** .25** .19* – .31** .34**
Arrows (trials/s) .01 .24* .17 .24* .05 .13 – .32**
Smiling Faces
(trials/s)
.27** .24* .04 .14 .15 .25** .20* –
Mean U.K. 10.81 134.50 6.52 12.53 7.63 26.02 0.67 0.44
H.K. 10.81 148.69 7.39 12.69 6.77 27.48 0.61 0.51
SD U.K. 0.34 12.93 2.45 3.77 2.13 3.56 0.48 0.12
H.K. 0.33 7.37 2.01 4.12 2.15 3.49 0.53 0.16
Range U.K. 10.05–
11.54
98–
163
1–10 3–19 1–12 18–36 0–1.82 0.10–0.93
H.K. 10.05–
11.55
101–
160
2–10 3–21 1–12 19–35 0–2.40 0.15–0.90
Note. U.K., United Kingdom; H.K., Hong Kong; SD, standard deviation. Correlations for the U.K. sample are presented above the
diagonal. Correlations for the H.K. sample are presented below the diagonal.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
16 Z. Wang et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 149 (2016) 6–22information criterion (AIC) = 3463.10. The standardized factor loadings for the theory-of-mind latent
factor were .75 and .38 (ps < .01). The standardized factor loadings for the executive function latent
factor ranged from .63 to .70 (all ps < .001). The theory-of-mind latent factor was moderately corre-
lated with the executive function latent factor (/ = .43, p = .01).
In Sample 2, we specified a two latent factor model in which each of the three theory-of-mind task
indicators loaded onto a theory-of-mind latent factor and each of the three executive function task
indicators loaded onto an executive function latent factor. The two latent factor model fit the data
well, v2(8) = 13.64, p = .09, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .95, TLI = .91, AIC = 7146.43. Both latent factors
accounted for significant variance in task performance. The three theory-of-mind indicators loaded
significantly onto the theory-of-mind latent factor (mean loading = .50, range = .30–.69, all
ps < .001). The three executive function indicators loaded significantly onto the executive function
latent factor (mean loading = .50, range = .38–.67, all ps < .001). The two latent factors were strongly
correlated (/ = .77, p < .001). Note that we chose to use a two latent factor solution for two reasons.
First, from a conceptual perspective, theory of mind and executive function are related but distinct
constructs. Meta-analytic evidence shows that individual differences in executive function and
theory-of-mind task performance are only moderately correlated (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Moreover,
findings suggest that the ‘‘real-life” correlates of executive function and theory of mind are distinct;
for example, the relations between executive function and problem behaviors are significantly greater
than those between theory of mind and problem behaviors in preschool children (Hughes & Ensor,
2008). Second, from an empirical standpoint, an alternative single latent factor model in both samples
did not provide a good fit to the data (Sample 1: v2(5) = 8.96, p = .11, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .94, TLI = .88,
AIC = 3467.98; Sample 2: v2(8) = 18.24, p = .03, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .92, TLI = .87, AIC = 7149.03).Modeling theory-of-mind task performance
Using data from Sample 1, we examined whether there were cultural differences in theory-of-mind
task performance using a structural equation in which the two latent factors of theory of mind and
executive function were regressed onto a binary ‘‘nation” variable. To reduce the potential influence
Fig. 1. Robust maximum likelihood estimates for correlates of individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) and executive
function (EF) in Sample 1. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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verbal ability, and self-reported family affluence (the latter of which is a socioeconomic status [SES]
indicator). This model provided an excellent fit to the data, v2(16) = 19.23, p = .26, RMSEA = .04,
CFI = .97, TLI = .95, AIC = 3423.38. The parameter estimates for this model are presented in Fig. 1.
When accounting for individual differences in executive function, age, verbal ability, and family afflu-
ence, there were no significant differences between the British children and the Hong Kong interna-
tional school children in their performance on the theory-of-mind latent factor. In contrast, there
was a weak but significant difference in performance between children in Hong Kong and children
in the United Kingdom on the executive function latent factor, with children from Hong Kong outper-
forming their British counterparts by .21 standardized units. This difference was independent of indi-
vidual differences in age, verbal ability, theory of mind, and family affluence.
Next, using data from Sample 2, we specified a similar structural equation model to examine cul-
tural differences in theory-of-mind task performance. To minimize potential confounds, we also
regressed each latent factor onto age, gender, number of siblings, parental education, and verbal abil-
ity scores. Our initial model did not provide a good fit to the data, v2(32) = 68.41, p < .001,
RMSEA = .07, CFI = .86, TLI = .78, AIC = 6888.13. Inspection of the modification indices revealed evi-
dence of differential item functioning in that nation exerted a direct effect on performance on both
the Strange Stories Task and Triangles Task (see below for more details). The inclusion of these regres-
sion paths improved the overall model fit, v2(30) = 37.13, p = .17, RMSEA = .03, CFI = .97, TLI = .95,
AIC = 6860.85 (see Fig. 2). Together, these models accounted for 65% of the variance in theory-of-
mind latent factor scores and 64% of the variance in executive function latent factor scores.
Echoing findings from preschool samples (e.g., Sabbagh et al., 2006), scores on the theory-of-mind
latent factor in Sample 2 were significantly lower for children from Hong Kong than for children from
the United Kingdom. Even when potential differences in executive function, parental education, num-
ber of siblings, and verbal ability were controlled, children from Hong Kong were, on average, .60 stan-
dardized units lower than children from the United Kingdom, indicating a medium to large difference
in performance (Brown, 2006; Cohen, 1988). The direct effect of nation on the Strange Stories Task and
Triangles Task indicators (independent of individual differences in the theory-of-mind latent factor)
showed that these indicators were not culturally invariant. That is, performance on these two tasks
Fig. 2. Robust maximum likelihood estimates for correlates of individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) and executive
function (EF) in Sample 2. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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ences favoring children in Hong Kong in aspects of these tasks that did not related to mental state
reasoning.
In direct contrast to the results for the theory-of-mind latent factor, children from Hong Kong out-
performed children from the United Kingdom on the executive function latent factor. When effects of
theory of mind, parental education, number of siblings, and verbal ability were controlled, children
from Hong Kong obtained scores that were, on average, .37 standardized units higher than those for
children from the United Kingdom. This is equivalent to a small difference in performance (Brown,
2006). There were no direct effects of nation on the indicators of executive function, suggesting that
these items were culturally invariant.
The structural equation model revealed moderate to strong correlations between theory of mind
and executive function latent factor scores as well as between each of these latent factors and verbal
ability. Parental education, SES, age, and gender exerted small but significant effects on executive
function (but not on theory of mind). The number of siblings a child had was unrelated to either theory
of mind or executive function.Discussion
In this article, we have presented data from two cross-cultural comparisons that jointly produced
three main findings. First, when effects of general child and family characteristics were taken into
account, theory-of-mind latent factor scores were equivalent for children in the United Kingdom
and children attending international schools in Hong Kong, but children attending local schools in
Hong Kong scored, on average, .60 standardized units lower than children from the United Kingdom,
indicating a medium to large effect. Second, the contrast between children in Hong Kong attending
local schools and those attending international schools was specific to theory of mind; both groups
outperformed their British counterparts on the executive function latent factor with small effect sizes,
.23 standardized units in Sample 1 and .37 standardized units in Sample 2. Third, in both samples, the
latent factors for theory of mind and executive function were correlated with either a moderate or
large effect size.
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up” in theory-of-mind performance during middle childhood. The results revealed no evidence for
such a catch-up, at least for Hong Kong local school pupils. The findings extend earlier reports of young
Hong Kong children’s delay on theory of mind (Liu et al., 2008) and demonstrate a persistent lag in
Hong Kong children’s social understanding. Furthermore, this lag could not be explained by factors
related to the global contrast between individualist and collectivist cultures because, unlike their
peers from Hong Kong local schools, children from Hong Kong international schools performed just
as well as their British counterparts on theory of mind. Instead, the results favor the pedagogical expe-
rience hypothesis, namely that children who were exposed to inquiry-based pedagogy (children in the
United Kingdom and children attending Hong Kong international schools) showed better theory-of-
mind performance than children who were exposed to the drill-and-practice pedagogy (Hong Kong
local school children).
What makes this conclusion more convincing is the fact that children attending international
schools in Hong Kong were better on executive function than the U.K. children, just as children attend-
ing local schools in Hong Kong outperformed their British counterparts. In other words, Hong Kong
international school pupils were culturally distinct from the U.K. children. Hong Kong international
school students were more likely to be bilingual, a factor that is believed to facilitate theory-of-
mind performance through enhanced attention control and inhibition rather than conceptual mental
state understanding per se (Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Kovács, 2009). By including executive function
in our models, we also controlled the potential confounding effect of bilingualism. Cantonese was the
main mode of instruction in Hong Kong local schools, in contrast to English in Hong Kong international
schools. Among other differences, the two languages differ in syntactical complement, which is
hypothesized to affect theory-of-mind development (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). However, findings
from a cross-lingual study (Cheung et al., 2004) suggest that syntax of complement per se does not
contribute to theory-of-mind development; rather, it is the general language comprehension that
matters.
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate about the cultural universality versus specificity of
theory-of-mind development by suggesting that it is not prudent to attribute cross-cultural differ-
ences in theory-of-mind development to a global individualist versus collectivist cultural distinction.
Children’s direct social environments, their micro systems in Bronfenbrenner’s (1977) terms, might
play a more important role in shaping the diverse paths of their theory-of-mind development. The
pedagogical experience hypothesis offers a more specific mechanism accounting for individual differ-
ences in theory of mind and highlights the importance of the quality of education in social under-
standing development. However, further longitudinal and intervention studies are necessary to
establish a causal relation between pedagogical experiences and theory-of-mind development.
The strong correlation between theory of mind with low executive demands and executive func-
tion in both samples extends Devine and Hughes’s (2014) meta-analytic finding regarding the associ-
ation between these two constructs during early childhood into middle childhood. The universality of
the relation across an extended period in development and across cultures provides a basis for under-
standing the nature of the relation between these constructs. Hong Kong children’s advantage in exec-
utive function and concurrent disadvantage in theory of mind during middle childhood resonate with
an earlier report of a similar inconsistency during early childhood (Sabbagh et al., 2006). This finding
challenges a simple ‘‘expression” account and supports an ‘‘emergence” account of the relation
between theory of mind and executive function. Viewed alongside the results from a meta-analysis
of longitudinal data (Devine & Hughes, 2014), our cross-cultural data indicate that during middle
childhood, just as during the preschool years, executive function facilitates (but is distinct from) the-
ory of mind.Limitations
The two samples were originally recruited for different studies. Sample 1 was slightly older than
Sample 2, and the children in the two samples completed slightly different tasks. Therefore, it is chal-
lenging to compare Hong Kong international school students with the local school students directly.
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different populations within Hong Kong.
Another potential limitation in our study is that there were socioeconomic status contrasts
between the different samples. Compared with the Hong Kong pupils at local schools in Sample 2,
the Hong Kong international school participants in Sample 1 were frommore affluent families. Within
Sample 2, the Hong Kong participants were from less affluent households with less educated parents
when compared with their British counterparts. We statistically controlled for these variables in all of
the models to account for these differences. It is worth noting that, with respect to parental education,
Sample 2 was representative of the respective populations. In comparison with the 30% to 50% of
employed U.K. adults who have higher education qualifications (Higher Education Statistics Agency,
2013), higher education in Hong Kong is available for only approximately 20% of the population
(Hong Kong Education Bureau, n.d.). This contrast supports the ecological validity of any conclusions
drawn from these samples.Conclusion
This study is the first East versus West comparison of theory of mind and executive function during
middle childhood. By expanding the age range to the much neglected period of middle childhood, our
study adds valuable evidence on theory-of-mind use during this stage of development. Building on the
well-documented delay in Hong Kong preschoolers’ theory-of-mind acquisition, our study demon-
strated, for the first time, the similarities and differences in mental state understanding beyond early
childhood in children in Hong Kong when compared with children in the United Kingdom. Specifically,
the contrast between children in Hong Kong attending local schools and those attending international
schools carries important educational implications.
Our study found that children in Hong Kong attending local (but not international) schools showed
a delay in theory-of-mind development compared with their British counterparts. In contrast, both
groups of children from Hong Kong outperformed the British children on executive function measures.
These results highlight the potential cost of drilling and rote learning (the dominant model in local
Hong Kong schools) for children’s understanding of others. Our study also extends earlier reports
on the association between theory of mind and executive function of preschoolers to middle childhood
and demonstrates that, despite a clear advantage on executive function tasks, children in Hong Kong
do not outperform their British counterparts on tests of theory of mind. This dissociation suggests an
interesting contrast in the salience of social influences on executive function and theory of mind that
deserves further examination in future studies.Acknowledgments
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